Six Unconstitutional Homicide Statutes: Rational Basis Review and the Problem of Harsher Punishment for less Culpable Offenders by Rodriguez, Justin V.
09_RODRIGUEZ_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009 12:26 PM 
 
(231) 
COMMENT 
SIX UNCONSTITUTIONAL HOMICIDE STATUTES: 
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND THE PROBLEM 
OF HARSHER PUNISHMENT FOR LESS 
CULPABLE OFFENDERS 
JUSTIN V. RODRIGUEZ† 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................232 
I. THE “HARSHER PUNISHMENT FOR LESS CULPABLE  
OFFENDERS” PROBLEM:  AN EXAMPLE ...........................................237 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE CALIBRATION  
OF PUNISHMENT TO CULPABILITY ..................................................238 
A. Contemporary Rational Basis Review Doctrine  
and the “One Step at a Time” Rationale .................................238 
B. One Step at a Time and the Punishment/ 
Culpability Problem ...............................................................239 
1. Fraternal Order of Police I ...........................................240 
2. Fraternal Order of Police II .........................................241 
III. JUSTIFYING HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF  
THE PUNISHMENT/CULPABILITY PROBLEM ...................................242 
A. Legislative Resistance to the Punishment/ 
Culpability Problem ...............................................................242 
1. Practical Consequences of  
Piecemeal Legislation .............................................242 
2. Public-Choice Theory .............................................244 
3. Political-Process Theory ..........................................246 
B. Legislative Contemplation of Judges as Primarily  
Responsible for Just Sentencing ...............................................247 
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2007, Harvard 
College.  The author would like to thank Michael B. Jones of the New Jersey Office of 
the Public Defender, Appellate Division, for his mentorship and the editorial staff 
members of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for all their hard work.  
09_RODRIGUEZ_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:26 PM 
232 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 231 
IV. THE BIG CULPRIT:  THE DENIAL OF THE PASSION/PROVOCATION 
DEFENSE TO CHARGES OF EXTREME-RECKLESSNESS HOMICIDE .....249 
A. Common Law Understandings of the Availability of the  
Passion/Provocation Defense to a Charge of  
Extreme-Recklessness Homicide ...............................................250 
B. The Disparity’s Irrational Relation  
to Legitimate State Interests ....................................................251 
C. The New York and New Jersey Cases .......................................254 
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................258 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The correlation of punishment to culpability stands firmly as the 
bedrock principle upon which legislatures construct criminal codes.1  
Ordinarily, codes punish more culpable offenders more severely than 
less culpable offenders who are guilty of the same crime.2  Occasional-
ly, legislatures deviate from a perfect correlation.  For example, legis-
latures might punish offenders whose extremely reckless conduct is 
the cause of a crime as severely as those offenders who commit the 
same crime purposely or knowingly.3  When, however, a code punishes 
offenders who commit a crime with a less culpable mens rea more se-
verely than offenders who commit the same crime with a more culpa-
ble mens rea, the disparity may signal not only “unenlightened penol-
ogy”4 but also constitutional impropriety. 
 
1 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18 (“[A] scale of crimes should be 
formed, with a corresponding scale of punishments . . . .”); Bernard E. Gegan, More 
Cases of Depraved Mind Murder:  The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 467 
(1990) (“[T]he most fundamental policy of any system of graded punishments is that 
even the guilty should not be punished beyond their deserts. . . . [A]n offender’s 
deserts are inextricably connected with his subjective state as much as with the harmful 
consequences he caused or the circumstances in which he acted.”); James Boyd White, 
Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396, 1403 (2002) (“[L]egislative assignment of de-
grees of culpability to the different elements [of a crime] is to be the product of a rea-
soned judgment based upon the fundamental principle that the criminal law should 
provide a graduated set of punishments to reflect graduated levels of blameworthiness.”). 
2 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2–.3 (1962) (punishing reckless homicide 
less severely than purposeful or knowing homicide). 
3 See, e.g., id. § 210.2 (punishing homicide “committed recklessly under circums-
tances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” as severely as pur-
poseful or knowing homicide). 
4 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 250 n.65 (1980).  
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Although the operation and precise statutory language5 of each 
code varies slightly, the homicide statutes of six states—Alaska,6 Kan-
sas,7 Maine,8 Minnesota,9 New Jersey,10 and New York11—provide the 
 
5 Throughout this Comment, I refer to as “extreme recklessness” reckless conduct 
that (1) manifests an extreme indifference to the value of human life, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.110(a)(2) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3402(b) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:11-4(a)(1) (West 2005); (2) manifests depraved indifference to the value of hu-
man life, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(1)(B) (2006); (3) is eminently dangerous 
to others and evinces a depraved mind without regard for human life, MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.195(a) (2008); or (4) evinces a depraved indifference to human life, N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2009).  Additionally, I will refer to as the “pas-
sion/provocation defense” proof that the defendant acted (1) in the heat of passion 
and upon serious provocation, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (2008); (2) in the heat of 
passion resulting from reasonable provocation, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 
2005); (3) upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3403(a) (2007); (4) under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought 
about by adequate provocation, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 201(3) (2006); (5) in 
the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a per-
son of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, MINN. STAT. § 609.20(1) (2008); 
or (6) under extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable expla-
nation or excuse, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 2009).  Although the sta-
tutory formulations of extreme-recklessness homicide and the passion/provocation 
defense differ from state to state, the unavailability of the latter as a defense to a 
charge of the former raises the same constitutional issue.  State punishment schemes 
that provide the passion/provocation defense in the case of purposeful or knowing 
homicide but not for extreme-recklessness homicide may effectively impose a harsher 
punishment for a less culpable crime.  See infra notes 6-12.   
6 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.100–.120, 12.55.125 (2008) (amended 2009) (estab-
lishing purposeful homicide as murder in the first degree, punishable by twenty to ni-
nety-nine years in prison; extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the second de-
gree, punishable by twenty to ninety-nine years in prison; and passion and provocation 
as a defense to purposeful homicide but not extreme-recklessness homicide, punisha-
ble as manslaughter by not more than twenty years in prison).  
7 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3401 to -3403, -4704, -4706 (2007) (amended 2009) 
(establishing purposeful homicide as murder in the first or second degree, punishable 
by life or 147 to 165 months in prison, respectively; extreme-recklessness homicide as 
murder in the second degree, punishable by 109 to 123 months in prison; and passion 
and provocation as a defense to intentional killings but not killings caused by extreme 
recklessness, punishable as voluntary manslaughter by fifty-five to sixty-one months in prison). 
8 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 201, 203, 1251–1252 (2006) (establishing 
purposeful homicide as murder, punishable by twenty-five years to life in prison; ex-
treme-recklessness homicide as murder, punishable by twenty-five years to life in pris-
on; and passion and provocation as a defense to purposeful homicide but not extreme-
recklessness homicide, punishable as manslaughter by up to thirty years in prison).  
9 See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185–.20 (2008) (establishing purposeful homicide as 
murder in the first or second degree, punishable by life or up to forty years in prison, 
respectively; extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the third degree, punishable 
by up to twenty-five years in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to inten-
tional killings but not killings caused by extreme recklessness, punishable as man-
slaughter in the first degree by not more than fifteen years in prison, a fine of not 
more than $30,000, or both). 
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most glaring examples of the “harsher punishment for less culpable 
offenders” problem.  With respect to homicide committed in the heat 
of passion and upon reasonable provocation (passion/provocation 
homicide), each code fails so dramatically to correlate punishment to 
culpability as to call into question its compatibility with the constitu-
tional guarantee of equal protection.12  In these states, offenders who 
purposely or knowingly cause the death of another person, while in 
the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation, are punished 
less harshly than offenders who cause the death of another person 
due to their extremely reckless conduct (extreme-recklessness homi-
cide) while in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation.  
Consequently, the more culpable criminal class is subjected to less se-
vere punishment for commission of the same crime—homicide com-
mitted in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation. 
The “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” problem 
cannot withstand equal protection scrutiny.  Legislation that does not 
implicate a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right con-
forms to the Equal Protection Clause if the law bears a rational rela-
tion to some conceivable legitimate state interest.13  Courts often af-
ford legislatures great discretion to develop solutions to targeted 
 
10 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3 to :11-4, :43-6(a)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007) 
(establishing purposeful homicide as murder, punishable by thirty years to life in pris-
on; extreme-recklessness homicide as aggravated manslaughter, punishable by ten to 
thirty years in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to murder but not to 
aggravated manslaughter, punishable as manslaughter by five to ten years in prison).  
11 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 125.20–.25 (McKinney 2009) (establishing pur-
poseful homicide as murder in the second degree, punishable by up to life in prison; 
extreme-recklessness homicide as murder in the second degree, punishable by up to 
life in prison; and passion and provocation as a defense to purposeful homicide but 
not extreme-recklessness homicide, punishable as manslaughter in the first degree by 
up to twenty-five years in prison). 
12 In addition to the prison sentences outlined in the notes above, the sentencing 
guidelines of all six states systematically burden, especially with respect to subsequent 
offenses, offenders convicted of extreme-recklessness homicide.  These offenders, who 
cannot assert the passion/provocation defense, are sentenced more severely than of-
fenders who can assert the defense to a charge of purposeful or knowing murder.  See 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2008) (amended 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4704 (2007); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251–1254, 1256–1259 (2006) (amended 2009); 
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.095–.168 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6 (West 2005); N.Y. PEN-
AL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 2009). 
13 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification cannot run afoul 
of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity 
of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”); City of Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is that legislation 
is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
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problems “one step at a time, addressing [themselves] to the phase of 
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”14  Thus, 
not only does “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” legis-
lation bear no rational relation to any legitimate state interest tradi-
tionally associated with criminal lawmaking—deterrence, retribution, 
incapacitation, or rehabilitation—but it in fact undermines these 
goals.  While victims of the punishment/culpability problem do not 
constitute a recognized suspect class,15 the problem presents compel-
ling justifications for closer judicial scrutiny within the rational basis 
framework.16 
The problem demands a theory and application of rational basis 
review that accounts for the unique political and institutional con-
cerns surrounding the calibration of punishment to culpability.  Such 
concerns are absent from consideration of most social or economic 
legislation and contradict the fundamental premise of the “one step at 
a time” paradigm.  Civil legislation is often the product of compro-
mise and competing factions.  Criminal law, however, does not benefit 
from dynamic evolution, which disrupts the punishment/culpability 
equilibrium.  Although legislatures establish general requirements of 
culpability that purport to govern the entirety of their criminal codes 
they lack the incentive to harmonize punishment and culpability over 
time.  Most criminal codes are the product of myopic piecemeal legis-
lation—influenced by political pressures, such as strong-on-crime in-
itiatives—that blind legislators to how a specific enactment fits into a 
comprehensive statutory scheme.17 
Judges are better suited than legislatures to holistically evaluate 
how well criminal codes calibrate punishment to culpability.  Con-
 
14 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
15 See Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process:  A Tale 
of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 489 (suggesting that criminals are not a suspect 
class but that, due to their political powerlessness, they nevertheless deserve judicial 
protection). 
16 Although this Comment advocates heightened judicial scrutiny of punish-
ment/culpability problems within the rational basis framework, it would be inaccurate 
to describe the argument as advocating for “rational basis with bite.”  The Supreme 
Court’s “rational basis with bite” cases have struck down discriminatory classifications, 
without employing suspect-class or strict scrutiny language, on the basis of impermissi-
ble government purpose.  Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 
85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 313-14 (1997).  There is little reason to suspect that most punish-
ment/culpability problems are intended by legislatures.  
17 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of 
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644-45 (2005) (noting the general lack 
of constituencies opposed to crime legislation). 
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fronted with the problem ex post by a party prejudiced by an unjust 
correlation, most states’ sentencing guidelines18 make judges primarily 
responsible for meting out just punishment.  The political toxicity of 
any legislative attempt at harmonizing punishment and culpability 
means that judges must ensure that the legislature does not “step[] 
most harshly on those persons the state[] ha[s] systematically deemed 
less culpable,” even when taking one step at a time.19 
This Comment proposes justifications for critical judicial review of 
the “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” problem.  It ar-
gues that the problem’s most glaring and prevalent incarnation—the 
denial of the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-
recklessness homicide—violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantee. 
 Part I provides a paradigmatic fact pattern illustrating the pu-
nishment/culpability problem and pinpointing the precise elements 
of comparative unfairness that implicate equal protection concerns.  
Part II evaluates the playing field of rational basis review and high-
lights the incompatibility of the doctrine’s basic assumptions with the 
correlation of punishment to culpability.  It argues that the “one step 
at a time” paradigm inadequately monitors legislatures’ success in de-
fining and applying culpability principles consistently to the entire 
body of criminal law—an a priori definitional commitment missing 
from the civil lawmaking enterprise.  Part III, without suggesting that 
victims of the problem constitute a “suspect class,” suggests the need 
for more searching judicial inquiry into the punishment/culpability 
problem.  It draws on models of legislative default proposed by politi-
cal-process theory and public-choice theory to underscore acute polit-
ical and institutional concerns that the problem presents.  These con-
cerns highlight the ease with which the problem may crop up in 
criminal codes and the importance of equipping judges with an ade-
quate framework both for remedying current infestations and pre-
venting future ones.20  Part IV applies the proposed approach to the 
most prevalent instance of the punishment/culpability problem—the 
 
18 For examples of state sentencing guidelines, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
19 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 
reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). 
20 Though examining a statutory and not a constitutional issue, the Supreme 
Court decided one case involving poorly correlated punishment and culpability this 
past Term.  See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (examining a 
federal criminal statute punishing aggravated identity theft with mandatory consecu-
tive two-year prison terms).   
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denial of the passion/provocation defense to offenders convicted of 
extreme-recklessness homicide.  Entertaining and rebutting counter- 
arguments that the denial of the defense may justifiably survive ra-
tional basis review, Part IV argues that the denial of the defense does 
not rationally further any legitimate state interest but rather under-
mines the state’s interests in deterrence and incapacitation.  Part IV 
concludes by evaluating the analytically unsatisfactory attempts by 
courts in New York and New Jersey to grapple with the pas-
sion/provocation punishment/culpability problem.  The Comment 
finally offers a brief conclusion. 
I.  THE “HARSHER PUNISHMENT FOR LESS CULPABLE  
OFFENDERS” PROBLEM:  AN EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the “harsher punishment for less culpable offenders” 
problem, consider the following hypothetical.  Lenny Lessculpable ar-
rives at his second-floor apartment only to find his unfaithful spouse 
in the midst of a sexual rendezvous—a provocation that a jury might 
easily deem “sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person 
beyond the power of his or her control,” thereby triggering the pas-
sion/provocation defense.21  In response, Lenny throws him out of his 
second-floor window and kills him.  He defenestrates this adulterer 
not to purposely or knowingly kill him, or even to cause him severe 
bodily injury, but rather to disrupt the physical act of infidelity and 
remove the adulterer from his wife and home.  Although it is not cer-
tain that the fall will kill the man, it is probable, and Lenny chooses to 
ignore this risk.  If a jury finds that Lenny purposely or knowingly 
caused the man’s death, it will next consider whether Lenny acted in 
the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation.22  Undoubtedly, 
however, a jury may alternatively find that Lenny acted without intent 
to kill but rather recklessly or, even worse, recklessly under circums-
tances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.23  If the jury 
finds the latter, Lenny cannot invoke the passion/provocation defense 
in six states.24 
Now imagine a similar scenario unfolding in a twentieth-floor 
penthouse.  When confronted with the same problem as Lenny, 
 
21 See State v. Oglesby, 585 A.2d 916, 923 (N.J. 1991) (outlining the typical doc-
trinal framework for passion/provocation homicide).  
22 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005) (defining manslaughter). 
23 Id. 
24 See supra notes 6-12. 
09_RODRIGUEZ_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:26 PM 
238 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 231 
Maury Moreculpable screams, “I’m going to kill you!” and throws him 
through the penthouse window.  Maury may invoke the pas-
sion/provocation defense because he purposely or knowingly caused 
the man’s death, given that death would be practically certain to result 
in such a situation and those six states would allow the defense.25  It is 
difficult to imagine why, when confronted with the same reasonable 
provocation, a defendant’s punishment should depend on the dis-
tance between his apartment and the ground—a difficulty that impli-
cates the Equal Protection Clause’s command that “all persons similar-
ly situated should be treated alike.”26 
II.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE CALIBRATION  
OF PUNISHMENT TO CULPABILITY 
A.  Contemporary Rational Basis Review Doctrine and 
the “One Step at a Time” Rationale 
An equal protection challenge to legislation that creates a pu-
nishment/culpability problem triggers rational basis review.  Of 
course, any legislative allocation of burdens and benefits creates dis-
criminatory classifications that result in unequal protection of the 
law.27  If, however, the legislation does not implicate a suspect class or 
impinge upon a fundamental right, courts will refuse to invalidate the 
law on equal protection grounds if the classification bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.28  A legislature need not arti-
culate or produce evidence of the actual purpose of a discriminatory 
classification.29  The legislation will withstand rational basis review so 
long as “any reasonably conceivable state of facts . . . provide[s] a ra-
tional basis for the classification,”30 even if that set of facts is imagined 
post hoc for litigation purposes. 
 
25 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(2) (West 2005) (defining the culpability level 
“knowingly”). 
26 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also 
Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985) (noting that, like the Four-
teenth Amendment, the New Jersey Constitution protects “against the unequal treat-
ment of those who should be treated alike”). 
27 See ELY, supra note 4, at 30-31 (illustrating how “we all order our lives” on legisla-
tive allocations of burdens and benefits). 
28 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40.  
29 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 15 (1992)). 
30 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  
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Legislatures do not act irrationally for equal protection purposes 
by devising classifications that remedy certain elements of an identi-
fied problem and that neglect to remedy others.31  Rational basis re-
view allows legislatures to move “one step at a time, addressing . . . the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”32  For ex-
ample, a state may combat environmental concerns by outlawing  
nonrefillable plastic milk containers while refusing to prohibit equally 
harmful nonrefillable paper containers.33  The deference afforded by 
the “one step at a time” rationale acknowledges that “the give-and-take 
of the legislative compromise process is bound to make subtle, even 
apparently arbitrary distinctions as exceptions and exemptions are 
created to mollify opposition.”34  If legislatures could not create such 
exemptions for fear of invalidation on equal protection grounds, “leg-
islative reform in the face of close political battles and powerful lob-
bies,” such as efforts to enact antidiscrimination laws, “might not pro-
ceed.”35  By allowing piecemeal development of exclusionary 
legislation, courts encourage creative legislative solutions to complex 
social, political, and economic problems.36 
B.  One Step at a Time and the Punishment/Culpability Problem 
The “one step at a time” rationale, ordinarily well-suited to review 
of most social and economic legislation,37 fails to justify judicial re-
straint in the face of a punishment/culpability problem.  Defenders of 
a poorly correlated punishment/culpability statutory scheme may 
 
31 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1976) (per curiam) 
(upholding the exemption of pushcarts in operation for more than eight years from 
prohibition in the French Quarter); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106, 109-10 (1949) (upholding a statute that forbids, so as to reduce visual clutter, 
truck owners from leasing advertisement space on their vehicles but allowing them to 
advertise their own products and services). 
32 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
33 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472-73 (1981). 
34 JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4:21 (2008).  
35 Id.  
36 See Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 
YALE L.J. 1777, 1784 (1981). 
37 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (using rational basis review to 
invalidate a Texas statute denying funds to children of illegal immigrants); Schilb v. 
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971) (“The Court more than once has said that state legis-
lative reform by way of classification is not to be invalidated merely because the legisla-
ture moves one step at a time.”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479-81 (1970) 
(applying the “one step at a time” rationale to hold that, so long as Maryland promptly 
furnished aid to eligible individuals under the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children program, it did not have to fully meet each individual’s standard of need). 
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employ the rationale to argue that legislatures are free to impose se-
vere punishments on less culpable offenders before imposing them on 
more culpable offenders.  Given the liberty interests of the offenders 
in question, however, criminal law strives to create a more just and 
cohesive system of allocating burdens and benefits than ordinary civil, 
social, and economic legislation.  While judicial restraint encourages 
dynamism in the civil sphere, it endangers justice in the criminal 
sphere when disparities of punishment and culpability threaten core a 
priori principles.  The glue that allows for a cohesive system of crimi-
nal justice, unavailable in the civil context, is the careful calibration of 
culpability to punishment.  When “one step” is taken to dissolve that 
glue, the result is not reform but regression. 
1.  Fraternal Order of Police I 
The incompatibility of the “one step at a time” rationale with the 
punishment/culpability problem emerged in Fraternal Order of Police v. 
United States (FOP I).38  The case presented a challenge to the “public 
interest” exception of the Gun Control Act of 1968.39  The Act allows 
states “to arm police officers convicted of violent felonies, and even 
crimes of domestic violence so long as those crimes are felonies, while 
withholding this privilege with respect to domestic violence misde-
meanors.”40  The D.C. Circuit noted that the government failed to of-
fer any reason “for imposing the heavier disability on the lighter of-
fense.”41  Attempting to imagine a “conceivable justification” for the 
scheme, the government invoked the Williamson principle, claiming 
that Congress could punish the less culpable offenders (misdemea-
nants) as a first step.42  The court rejected this invocation of the “one 
step at a time” rationale, noting that it “would allow a rougher notion 
of justice than even ‘rational basis’ review allows.”43  While conceding 
that “Congress may take one step at a time,” the court reasoned that 
the guarantee of equal protection could not allow Congress to “step[] 
most harshly on those persons the states have systematically deemed 
less culpable.”44  This “systematic” assortment is unique to the criminal 
 
38 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
39 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 923–928 (2006). 
40 152 F.3d at 1002.  
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 1003.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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sphere.  Implicit in the court’s reasoning is the conflict between the 
aims of the “one step at a time” rationale and the goals of a properly 
crafted criminal justice system.  While the “one step at a time” ratio-
nale is meant to allow for the dynamic evolution of legal responses to 
social and economic problems, a criminal justice system should aim to 
treat like cases alike by means of a consistent correlation of punish-
ment to culpability. 
2.  Fraternal Order of Police II 
The D.C. Circuit reheard the case (FOP II) and vacated its holding 
in FOP I that the Gun Control Act’s public interest exception violates 
the Equal Protection Clause.45  However, it preserved its critique of the 
“one step at a time” rationale’s application to the punishment/culpability 
problem.  After taking a more comprehensive view of the legislative 
scheme, the court found that the public interest exception did not 
present a punishment/culpability problem.  The court determined 
that, in its previous opinion, it had overlooked the nonlegal restric-
tions imposed by states, such as formal and informal hiring practices, 
that may prevent felons from obtaining firearms covered by the Act.46  
The aggregation of punishments imposed by both state and federal 
law, the court reasoned, offsets the Act’s prima facie disparity between 
punishment and culpability.47 
The FOP II court’s rationale is inapposite both to most manifesta-
tions of the punishment/culpability problem and to the denial of the 
passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-recklessness ho-
micide.48  The court interpreted the problematic legislation in FOP I 
and FOP II as incorporating state law and practice.49  The punish-
ment/culpability problem remains, however, when there is no offset-
ting congressional or state legislation—for example, when the only re-
levant punishment is a creature of state law.  In those situations, the 
assumption underlying both FOP I and FOP II remains:  a state violates 
the Equal Protection Clause by stepping most harshly on those of-
fenders it systematically deems less culpable. 
 
45 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
46 Id. at 904.  
47 Id.  
48 See infra Part IV. 
49 152 F.3d at 1003.   
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III.  JUSTIFYING HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF 
THE PUNISHMENT/CULPABILITY PROBLEM 
Although FOP I and FOP II emphasize the intuition that legisla-
tures should be required to conform their criminal laws to the foun-
dational principles of culpability upon which they are built, the D.C. 
Circuit did not articulate a clear justification as to why more exacting 
judicial review should be the primary mechanism through which to 
guarantee such compliance.  Courts have refused to extend suspect-
class status to criminal law offenders.50  Consideration of the institu-
tional competencies and incentives of legislatures and judges, howev-
er, offers at least two broad justifications for heightened judicial re-
view of the punishment/culpability problem within the context of 
rational basis review:  (1) legislatures have strong incentives to create 
and subsequently avoid correction of punishment/culpability prob-
lems, even in the absence of any legitimate governmental reason to do 
so; and (2) legislatures explicitly task judges with meting out just pu-
nishment. 
A.  Legislative Resistance to the Punishment/Culpability Problem 
Legislators are often unsympathetic to issues of criminal law that 
unjustly burden criminal defendants, such as the punish-
ment/culpability problem.  Two dominant theories—public-choice 
theory and Michael Klarman’s extension of John Hart Ely’s political-
process theory—have emerged to explain the problem of “legislative 
default” in the criminal lawmaking enterprise.51  Coupled with the 
practical consequences of piecemeal legislation, application of both 
theories to the punishment/culpability problem justifies heightened 
judicial scrutiny of the rationality of any legislation that punishes a less 
culpable class of offenders more severely than a more culpable class 
guilty of the same crime. 
1.  Practical Consequences of Piecemeal Legislation 
Inspired by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, more 
than two-thirds of the states adopted reformed criminal codes in the 
 
50 For a collection of cases denying suspect-class status to prisoners, see Twenty-Fifth 
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure (pt. 6), 84 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1494 n.2975 (1996).   
51 See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”:  Why Congress 
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 604 (“Academics 
have developed at least two theories (political process and public choice) to explain 
and predict ‘legislative default’ in the criminal procedure field.”). 
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1960s and early 1970s.52  Over the last thirty to forty years, most 
amendments to those recodified criminal laws have undermined the 
legislatures’ earlier progress.53  One result of this degradation has 
been the proliferation of “designer offenses,” seemingly redundant 
crimes already addressed by general provisions of a code, such as the 
specification of library theft as an offense separate from general 
theft.54  Another result has been the distortion of culpability and pu-
nishment within the gradation of specific offenses, such as homicide.  
As two scholars intimately involved in the process of reforming crimi-
nal codes have noted, “[T]he entire process of amendment by piece-
meal legislation generally encourages changes without regard for 
their impact on the overall consistency or rationality of the code,” with 
“ad hoc amendments tend[ing] naturally to distort grading judgments.”55 
Although some punishment/culpability problems develop not 
over time but in the first instance, the evolution of New Jersey’s homi-
cide statute illustrates the vulnerability of a precisely regulated system 
of punishment and culpability to the warping effects of piecemeal leg-
islation.  As enacted in 1978, New Jersey’s Code of Criminal Justice 
contained no provision for extreme-recklessness homicide.56  Under 
the 1978 Code, criminal homicide constituted manslaughter—a crime 
of the second degree—when committed recklessly.57  Similarly, crimi-
nal homicide otherwise qualifying as murder under the Code,58 when 
committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provoca-
tion, also constituted manslaughter.59  Under that version of the Code, 
a homicide committed under circumstances justifying a pas-
sion/provocation defense subjected a defendant to the same punish-
ment regardless of whether it was committed purposely, knowingly, or 
with extreme recklessness.  The 1978 manslaughter statute contained 
 
52 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 17, at 634.   
53 Id.  
54 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second 
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 & n.6 (2003) (“For ex-
ample, in Illinois, while there is a general theft offense, the Illinois General Assembly 
has nonetheless added by amendment a special offense for theft of delivery containers 
as well as other specific theft offenses.” (footnotes omitted)).  
55 Id. at 172 (italics omitted).  
56 New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, 1978 N.J. Laws 482. 
57 Id. § 2C:11-4(a)(1), 1978 N.J. Laws at 541 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(1) (West 2005)). 
58 That is, a homicide committed purposely, knowingly, or during the course of 
certain felonies. 
59  New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, ch. 95, § 2C:11-4(a)(2), 1978 N.J. Laws 
482, 541 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 2005)). 
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no disparate treatment of offenders who caused death under passion 
and provocation and therefore did not suffer from a punish-
ment/culpability problem. 
The Code was to take effect on September 1, 1979, but, before it 
did, the legislature created the offense of aggravated manslaughter.  
The legislature provided that criminal homicide constituted aggra-
vated manslaughter, a crime of the first degree, upon the presence of 
“circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.”60  By 
creating the offense of aggravated manslaughter, a crime that would 
not “otherwise be murder [under the Code],”61 the legislature denied 
those defendants who cause death by extreme recklessness the same 
opportunity for mitigation afforded to those who cause death pur-
posely or knowingly, thereby subjecting the former class to a harsher 
penalty.  In 1986, the legislature further exacerbated the disparate 
treatment by upgrading the ordinary term of imprisonment for aggra-
vated manslaughter from between ten and twenty years to between ten 
and thirty years and the extended term of imprisonment from be-
tween twenty years and life imprisonment to between thirty years and 
life imprisonment.62  Ultimately, the evolution of New Jersey’s homi-
cide statute demonstrates that the process of piecemeal legislation 
poses grave risks to a legislature’s fidelity to its definitional hierarchy 
of culpability and punishment. 
2.  Public-Choice Theory 
Public-choice theory explains why, in addition to the problems in-
herent in any attempt at piecemeal lawmaking, legislatures lack any 
incentive to maintain a well-calibrated system of punishment and cul-
pability.  The theory envisions “the legislative process as a microeco-
nomic system in which ‘actual political choices are determined by the 
 
60 Act of Aug. 29, 1979, ch. 178, 1979 N.J. Laws 685 (codified as amended at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)).  The 1979 amendment defined aggravated man-
slaughter as a criminal homicide committed by an actor who “other than purposely or 
knowingly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to hu-
man life.”  Id.  A 1981 amendment substituted “recklessly” for “other than purposely or 
knowingly.”  Act of Sept. 24, 1981, ch. 290, 1981 N.J. Laws 1108 (codified as amended 
at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)). 
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4(b)(2) (West 2005). 
62 Act of Dec. 8, 1986, ch. 172, 1986 N.J. Laws 876 (codified as amended at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005)). 
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efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests.’”63  For 
example, proposing or voting for a penalty enhancement, even 
though it may result in a punishment/culpability problem for a par-
ticular offense, can further a legislator’s own interest by bolstering her 
tough-on-crime profile.64  Such proposals “often sail through the legis-
lature with little public complaint, even though privately legislators 
recognize they contain serious flaws.”65  One legislator laments the 
“enormous, almost hydraulic pressure to pass any criminal law bill that 
is offered, unless you don’t care about [keeping] the job.”66 
The self-serving function of criminal law proposals makes seeking 
a remedy to punishment/culpability problems in the legislature en-
tirely futile.  Public-choice theory posits that legislators, when consi-
dering questions of criminal law, “will be motivated by what consum-
ers of this legislation are willing to pay for it, in such political currency 
as votes, volunteer time, and campaign contributions, either provided 
to the legislator or withheld from an opponent.”67  With respect to 
homicide legislation, for example, even if the legislation presents a 
punishment/culpability problem, prosecutors and those voters fearful 
of crime will inevitably “outbid” any other coalition and succeed in in-
fluencing legislators.68  It is difficult even to imagine any viable coali-
tion that could enter a competing bid.  Most citizens simply imagine 
themselves as potential crime victims and not as potential suspects.69  
As Dripps explains, “[I]t is perfectly rational for legislators to perceive 
that there is considerable political risk, and very little return, to taking 
the side of the suspect. . . . The few beneficiaries of such a courageous 
political stand for the most part do not even know who they are.”70 
 
63 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-
LATION 52 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983)).  
64 Robinson & Cahill, supra note 17, at 634. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Inter-
view by Stephen Haedicke with Dawn Clark Netsch, former Ill. State Senator, in Chi., 
Ill. (Mar. 18, 2001)). 
67 Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; 
or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1079, 1089 (1993). 
68 See id. (explaining that there are more potential crime victims and members of 
the law-enforcement bureaucracy than potential criminals). 
69 Lerner, supra note 51, at 610.  
70 Dripps, supra note 67, at 1094.  
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3.  Political-Process Theory 
When the political process does not afford meaningful participa-
tion to those classes burdened by legislative classifications, John Hart 
Ely’s political-process theory advocates heightened judicial review of 
those classifications.  Believing that “the Constitution is overwhelming-
ly concerned . . . with ensuring broad participation in the processes 
and distributions of government,”71 Ely argues that “it is an appropri-
ate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic gov-
ernment running as it should, to make sure the channels of political 
participation and communication are kept open.”72  As an outgrowth 
of the framework espoused by Justice Stone in footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,73 Ely’s theory empowers judges to protect 
“the chronic losers in the give-and-take of the political process,” usual-
ly minority groups subject to widespread hostility, from “majoritarian 
institutions[’] . . . frustrat[ion] [of] the genuine democratic will.”74 
Although Ely did not envision the criminal class as a potential be-
neficiary of heightened scrutiny, the punishment/culpability problem 
presents a compelling justification for its inclusion.  Under the politi-
cal-process theory, widespread hostility toward a disadvantaged class 
establishes a prima facie case for its classification as a suspect class.75  
If, however, such hostility furthers a substantial and permissible legis-
lative goal, the prima facie case is rebutted.76  So while burglars may be 
subject to great societal hostility, laws criminalizing burglary and im-
posing on burglars a comparative disadvantage are legitimate, as they 
advance a clearly substantial goal:  the promotion of public safety.77  
The suspicion that usually accompanies the disadvantaging of a class 
subject to widespread hostility “is allayed so immediately it doesn’t 
even have time to register.”78 
While some scholars have argued for broad application of the po-
litical-process theory to criminal rights and procedure, a narrow ap-
 
71 ELY, supra note 4, at 87. 
72 Id. at 76. 
73 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
74 Lerner, supra note 51, at 606.  
75 ELY, supra note 4, at 153-54.  
76 Id. at 154.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.; see also Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicion-
less Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 165 n.138 (2007) (“Criminal status is a 
choice and a socially disfavored one at that.  Criminal laws burden criminals, but we do 
not subject them to strict scrutiny.”).   
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plication suffices to justify heightened scrutiny of the punish-
ment/culpability problem.  Applying Ely’s theory to the sphere of 
criminal procedure, Michael Klarman writes that “[b]ecause the polit-
ical process does not adequately represent the interests of those so-
cietal groups largely populating the criminal class, political-process 
theory demands judicial superintendence.”79  Though the argument 
for broad judicial vigilance over criminal lawmaking may be quite 
compelling, one rationale for judicial scrutiny of the punish-
ment/culpability problem can be gleaned from Ely’s basic “imme-
diately allayed suspicion” framework.  For example, there are myriad 
reasons to immediately allay any suspicion raised by imposing burdens 
on murderers that are harsher than those imposed on nonmurderers.  
Such suspicion, however, is not immediately allayed by imposing bur-
dens on murderers that are harsher than those imposed on other, 
more culpable murderers.  Because no substantial governmental in-
terest is furthered by burdening less culpable criminals with more se-
vere punishment, the concerns at the core of political-process theory 
reverse the traditional posture of complacency toward laws that target 
criminal behavior.80 
B.  Legislative Contemplation of Judges as Primarily  
Responsible for Just Sentencing 
The comparative institutional competencies of judges and legisla-
tures often dictate the degree of judicial deference granted to legisla-
tion challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.  With most legis-
lation, the investigatory power of legislatures coupled with their 
democratic accountability make them the more appropriate allocators 
of benefits and burdens.81  The “sentencing function,” however, “long 
has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches.”82  
With respect to sentencing, legislatures not only lack the incentive to 
correct punishment/culpability problems, but they often delegate this 
responsibility to judges in recognition of the judiciary’s relatively su-
 
79 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 766 (1991). 
80 Cf. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1229-30 (2006) (noting that the inherently unsuspicious nature of crimi-
nal laws disappears when ex-offenders are burdened more severely than nonoffenders). 
81 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“The 
Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases.  But it is for 
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
requirement.”). 
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989).  
09_RODRIGUEZ_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:26 PM 
248 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 231 
perior institutional competence.83  Although legislatures occupy the 
primary role in determining punishment,84 many legislatures also con-
template that judges will serve as the crucial mechanism in assuring 
just sentencing.85 
As evidenced by most state sentencing guidelines, the sentence an 
offender receives is more often a function of judicial, rather than leg-
islative, determination.86  For example, under the New Jersey sentenc-
ing guidelines, when a defendant has been convicted of a first- or 
second-degree offense, a judge may sentence the defendant as if he 
had been convicted of a crime one degree below that of the actual 
conviction if the judge finds that specified mitigating factors “substan-
tially outweigh” specified aggravating factors and “the interest of justice 
demands” a downgrade.87  Such discretion would seem to be an easy fix 
to punishment/culpability problems, especially to the denial of the 
passion/provocation defense to extreme-recklessness homicide.  Two 
obstacles stand in the way.  First, discretionary statutory authority can-
not cure a constitutional defect.  If a particular punish-
ment/culpability problem does violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
the decision to remedy that violation—for example, by imposing a 
 
83 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing:  The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 97 (1999) (ex-
plaining that Congress delegated the particulars of the new sentencing system to the 
judiciary because it realized that legislatures are not the best “primary sentencing lawmakers”). 
84 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Selecting the sentencing 
rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not . . . courts.”).  
85 The issue of whether judges or legislatures are better equipped to correct pu-
nishment/culpability problems is distinct from the Sixth Amendment concerns sur-
rounding sentencing that the Court has recently addressed.  In Jones v. United States, 
the Court stated that 
the constitutional proposition that drives our concern in no way “call[s] into 
question the principle that the definition of the elements of a criminal offense 
is entrusted to the legislature.”  The constitutional guarantees that give rise to 
our concern in no way restrict the ability of legislatures to identify the conduct 
they wish to characterize as criminal or to define the facts whose proof is es-
sential to the establishment of criminal liability.  The constitutional safeguards 
that figure in our analysis concern not the identity of the elements defining 
criminal liability but only the required procedures for finding the facts that 
determine the maximum permissible punishment; these are the safeguards 
going to the formality of notice, the identity of the factfinder, and the burden 
of proof. 
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
86 See, e.g., supra note 12. 
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007) (emphasis added). 
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sentence one degree lower—cannot be discretionary.88  Second, judi-
cial interpretation of the grant has imposed requirements that make 
correction of certain punishment/culpability problems very difficult.  
For example, the doctrinal requirements of the dropping-a-degree 
provision make it ill-equipped to cure New Jersey’s own punish-
ment/culpability problem regarding the denial of the pas-
sion/provocation defense to extreme-recklessness homicide.89  
Though the dropping-a-degree provision may not remedy punish-
ment/culpability problems by its own force, it nevertheless reveals a 
recognition by legislatures that the criminal classifications they make 
must be subjected to final review by judges “where the interest of jus-
tice demands.”90 
IV.  THE BIG CULPRIT:  THE DENIAL OF THE PASSION/PROVOCATION 
DEFENSE TO CHARGES OF EXTREME-RECKLESSNESS HOMICIDE 
Having critiqued the incompatibility of the “one step at a time” ra-
tionale with the punishment/culpability problem, and having devel-
oped institutional justifications for more searching judicial inquiry, 
this Comment can now consider whether a concrete manifestation of 
the problem violates the guarantee of equal protection.  Specifically, it 
examines the problem of denying the passion/provocation defense to 
charges of extreme-recklessness homicide.  Imposing a more severe 
burden on some offenders, those who in the heat of passion and upon 
reasonable provocation unintentionally cause the death of another 
person through extremely reckless conduct, than the burden imposed 
on other offenders, those who in the heat of passion and upon rea-
sonable provocation purposely or knowingly cause death, bears no ra-
tional relation to any legitimate state interest. 
 
88 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).   
89 Because “[t]he reasons justifying a downgrade must be ‘compelling,’ and some-
thing in addition to and separate from . . . the mitigating factors that substantially out-
weigh the aggravating factors,” State v. Megargel, 673 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. 1996) (em-
phasis added), a judge cannot remedy the equal protection violation by simply 
considering whether “[t]he defendant acted under a strong provocation” (a mitigating 
factor) or whether “[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the 
defendant’s conduct, though failing to establish a defense” (a mitigating factor), N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(3)–(4) (West 2005) (amended 2007).  With respect to ex-
treme-recklessness homicide, the downgrade requires “more compelling reasons” than 
those required to downgrade an ordinary first-degree crime.  Megargel, 673 A.2d at 267. 
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f)(2) (West 2005) (amended 2007). 
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A.  Common Law Understandings of the Availability of the  
Passion/Provocation Defense to a Charge of  
Extreme-Recklessness Homicide 
When considering the rationality of the relationship between pu-
nishment/culpability disparities and legitimate state interests—such as 
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation—an appreciation of the 
common law understanding of the offenses involved, though certainly 
not dispositive, aids a great deal.  Both the academic literature and the 
case law interpreting statutes that adopt common law rules resoun-
dingly agree that common law conceptions of culpability demand the 
availability of the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-
recklessness homicide.91 
The common law defined murder as killing another with “malice 
aforethought.”92  The concept of malice aforethought, as judicially in-
terpreted, encompassed both harboring intent to kill as well as wan-
ton recklessness.93  Regardless, however, of the particular mental cul-
pability that existed in a given case, “both judges and commentators 
[at common law] agreed:  if the accused were seriously provoked and 
lost control of himself in a heat of passion, he did not act with malice 
aforethought.”94  The heat of passion negates malice, according to the 
common law understanding;95 therefore, a homicide committed 
through wanton or extreme recklessness must be deemed worthy of 
mitigation when committed in the heat of passion.96 
Common law notions of passion/provocation and extreme reck-
lessness still resonate among most courts confronted with the pu-
nishment/culpability problem.  At least one commentator has argued 
that since the passion/provocation defense was equally applicable to 
intentional murder and extreme-recklessness murder under the 
 
91 One commentator suggests that 
[m]ost killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the intent-to-
kill sort . . . . But if [the killer], in the . . . [heat of] passion . . . should intend 
instead to do his tormentor serious bodily injury short of death, or if he 
should, without intending to kill him, endanger his life by very reckless (de-
praved heart) conduct, the resulting death ought equally to be voluntary man-
slaughter . . . . [T]he great majority of modern statutes . . . take this broad view. 
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10(a) (1986). 
92 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *195.  
93 But see Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 
537, 545 (1934) (arguing that malice aforethought included only intentional wrongdoing).   
94 Gegan, supra note 1, at 450. 
95 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 155 (15th ed. 1994). 
96 Gegan, supra note 1, at 456.  
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common law, an express statutory reference to the defense’s availabili-
ty to charges of extreme-recklessness murder would be superfluous.97  
Although the New York Court of Appeals has rejected this argument 
as a matter of statutory construction,98 the courts of most states whose 
statutes employ common law language adhere to the common law 
understanding.  The Supreme Court of California has held that “a 
killer who acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion lacks malice and 
is therefore not guilty of murder, irrespective of the presence or ab-
sence of an intent to kill.”99  Therefore, common law understanding 
dictates that a killer who “acts with conscious disregard for life, know-
ing such conduct endangers the life of another”—i.e., a killer who acts 
with extreme recklessness—is entitled to the mitigation of the pas-
sion/provocation defense.100 
B.  The Disparity’s Irrational Relation to Legitimate State Interests 
By providing the passion/provocation defense to charges of pur-
poseful homicide and denying it to charges of extreme-recklessness 
homicide, legislatures fail to rationally serve any legitimate state inter-
est and instead “step[] most harshly on those persons the state[] ha[s] 
systematically deemed less culpable.”101  Courts ordinarily allow legisla-
tures great discretion to further the traditional goals of criminal law-
making—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.102  
However, the denial of the passion/provocation defense in this in-
 
97 See id. at 456-57 (arguing that an extreme emotional disturbance defense to de-
praved mind murder should be implied under the New York statute). 
98 People v. Fardan, 628 N.E.2d 41, 42-44 (N.Y. 1993). 
99 People v. Lasko, 999 P.2d 666, 671 (Cal. 2000). 
100 Id. at 668; see also id. at 671 (“Under the Attorney General’s approach, one who 
shoots and kills another in the heat of passion and with the intent to kill is guilty only 
of voluntary manslaughter, yet one who shoots and kills another in the heat of passion 
and with conscious disregard for life but with the intent merely to injure, a less culpable 
mental state than intent to kill, is guilty of murder.  This cannot be, and is not, the law.”). 
101 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 
reh’g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999).  
102 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“Our traditional deference to 
legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does 
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.’” (quoting Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment))).  This Comment does not argue that since the punishment/culpability 
problem does not square with the most prevalent penological theories, it is a constitu-
tional issue.  Rather, the argument is that the punishment/culpability problem squares 
neither with any penological theory nor with any legitimate state interest. 
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stance irrationally undermines these, or any other, legitimate legisla-
tive goals. 
Consider two possible arguments that the passion/provocation 
punishment/culpability problem is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.  One possible argument is that there is no punish-
ment/culpability problem in the first place.  States may rationally rank 
extremely reckless conduct committed in the heat of passion above 
intentional conduct committed in the heat of passion in their culpa-
bility hierarchy, with correspondingly disparate penalties.  What legi-
timate state interest is served by this ordering?  It is difficult to speak 
of deterrence of conduct committed in the heat of passion and upon 
reasonable provocation.  As one commentator has noted, “persons 
who temporarily lose self-control under the stress of great provocation 
are both less likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and 
present less of a threat of further harm than those who commit the 
same acts as an unforced expression of their normal characters.”103  To 
the extent that persons subject to passion and provocation are sus-
ceptible to any deterrent effect, they will have more of an incentive to 
act purposely under the current regime (i.e., to intentionally cause 
death) than to act in a way that merely creates a high risk of death 
(i.e., to act with extreme recklessness).  In other words, Lenny Less-
culpable104 would be better served by shooting his victim in the head 
than by tossing him out of his second-story window and insisting that 
he harbored no intent to kill.  Implementing such perverse incentives 
does not rationally further the state’s interest in deterrence. 
Perhaps the ordering may be justified as furthering the state’s in-
terest in incapacitating more “dangerous” criminals.  Those who act 
with extreme recklessness may present a greater danger to society 
than those who act intentionally.  Certainly, criminal law may further 
the legitimate interest of “remov[ing] dangerous persons from the 
rest of society and incapacitat[ing] them from doing further harm.”105  
In the absence of passion and provocation, however, no state ranks ex-
tremely reckless conduct above intentional conduct, although some 
rank them equally.106  From an incapacitation perspective, it would be 
difficult to speak of Lenny’s conduct as somehow more dangerous or 
potentially more harmful than Maury’s.  With respect to Maury’s con-
duct, one death is certain to result.  With respect to Lenny’s conduct, 
 
103 Gegan, supra note 1, at 461-62. 
104 See supra Part I. 
105 Gegan, supra note 1, at 461.  
106 See supra notes 6-11.  
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no death is certain to result.107  If states did punish extremely reckless 
homicide more severely than intentional homicide, the argument 
would have greater force.  Because no state operates this way, howev-
er, the incapacitation argument makes sense only if passion and prov-
ocation somehow change the hierarchy calculus.  While passion and 
provocation do change the calculus, their effects are as applicable to 
intentional conduct as to extremely reckless conduct.108  If the mitigat-
ing effects were not equally applicable, another perverse result would 
follow:  mitigation would go “to those who intentionally do the great-
est harm known to the law but [would be] den[ied] . . . to those who, 
however reckless, did not actually intend the harm.”109  The punish-
ment/culpability problem inherent in the denial of the pas-
sion/provocation defense to charges of extreme-recklessness homi-
cide presents a rare instance of legislatures’ irrational pursuit of 
legitimate state interests in the enterprise of criminal lawmaking.110 
A second argument that the legislative scheme rationally furthers 
a legitimate state interest may challenge the logical compatibility of 
extremely reckless conduct and conduct committed in the heat of pas-
sion upon reasonable provocation.  This argument rests upon two ir-
rational assumptions:  (1) offenders who act with extreme recklessness 
upon passion and provocation retain a mastery of their understanding 
lost by those who act purposely and (2) sufficiently “hot” passion and 
provocation inevitably draws forth only the most criminal and willful 
acts.  In consideration of the first argument, recall once again the ex-
ample of Lenny Lessculpable and Maury Moreculpable.111  Although 
Maury behaved more dangerously than Lenny, both men’s actions 
crossed the threshold of reason and sound judgment.  Whether this 
threshold has been crossed, not how far past the threshold one travels, 
determines the availability of the passion/provocation defense.  This 
 
107 As to other innocent third parties—for example, pedestrians walking below—
Maury’s conduct is as potentially dangerous as Lenny’s conduct. 
108 See Gegan, supra note 1, at 462 (“The policy [of passion/provocation mitiga-
tion] is similarly applicable to those who kill intentionally or through gross recklessness.”). 
109 Id.  
110 An argument can be made that the perversity Gegan identifies stems from the 
legislation’s failure to achieve its own tautological purposes.  For example, defense 
lawyers in Lenny’s case will have an incentive not to contest the issue of intent so as to 
take advantage of the passion/provocation defense to purposeful, heat-of-passion ho-
micide.  Therefore, the practical consequences of the scheme will incentivize false 
concessions of purpose in the hope of receiving a lesser sentence.  See generally Note, 
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 n.34 (1972) 
(defining a statute’s “tautological purpose” as that “suggested by its terms”). 
111 See supra Part I. 
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threshold is understood as a “concession to the frailty of man” and as 
the point at which “the average person can understandably react vio-
lently to a sufficient wrong and hence some lesser punishment is ap-
propriate.”112  A variation of the Lenny/Maury hypothetical also dis-
poses of the second irrational presumption regarding passion and 
provocation:  that the heat of passion and a reasonable provocation 
will inevitably inspire only the most willful criminal acts.  Suppose 
that, instead of throwing the man out his second-floor window with no 
intent to kill him, Lenny had reached into his nightstand, pulled out a 
revolver, and fired three shots into the man’s head, thereby entitling 
himself to the passion/provocation defense.  Once Lenny crosses the 
threshold of self-control, reason, and judgment, there is no reason to 
believe that the latter response is any more likely to occur than the 
former.  As such, one toils to imagine a reason why the former, more 
constrained response warrants a more severe penalty than the latter, 
more malicious response. 
C.  The New York and New Jersey Cases 
The courts that have considered the issue have struggled to re-
concile the promotion of legitimate penological goals with the see-
mingly irrational denial of the passion/provocation defense to those 
who commit extreme-recklessness homicide.  As of this writing, the 
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court is the only court in 
the nation that has considered an equal protection challenge to this 
particular punishment/culpability problem.113  The court devoted one 
sentence of its four-sentence opinion to the argument: 
Since the “heat of passion” killer ordinarily focuses on one person and 
the depraved and reckless murderer usually acts more indiscriminately, 
as in this case, we cannot say that the legislative prerogative to authorize 
a mitigation-type defense to one crime and not the other is without a ra-
tional relationship to the purpose to be served.
114
 
The court reasoned that the differing patterns of violence underlying 
the disparate treatment justify its existence. 
The court’s justification for the disparity, however, is weak.  The 
Wingate court seems to equate focus (whether the killer had a particu-
lar target in mind) with culpability (whether the killer acted purpose-
ly, knowingly, or recklessly):  a depraved and reckless killer is unlikely 
 
112 State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1963).  
113 People v. Wingate, 422 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (mem.). 
114 Id. 
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also to be a heat-of-passion killer, says the court, because the former 
generally has a more indiscriminate focus than the latter.  Factually, 
this is clearly not always true.  A depraved and reckless murderer can 
act in a discriminating manner in the heat of passion and upon rea-
sonable provocation, focusing his attack on one particular person.  
One such instance of an extremely reckless killer acting in the heat of 
passion and upon reasonable provocation, but with a discrete target in 
mind, is Lenny Lessculpable.115  The court’s reasoning in Wingate, 
therefore, provides no answer to the question of why Lenny should be 
punished more severely than Maury. 
Even if the Wingate court were correct (depraved and reckless kill-
ers act more indiscriminately than most “heat of passion” killers, who 
act with a specific target in mind, and therefore should be punished 
more severely), its reasoning would contradict the traditional culpabil-
ity hierarchy established by most criminal codes.  Leaving aside the is-
sue of passion and provocation, even if a depraved and reckless killer 
acts more indiscriminately than a killer who acts purposely or kno-
wingly, no state punishes the former killer more severely than the lat-
ter killer, though some states, like New York, punish the former as se-
verely as the latter.116  Consider, for example, an extremely reckless 
driver who drives ninety miles per hour the wrong way down a one-way 
residential street and kills a pedestrian.  This individual clearly acts 
more indiscriminately than someone who purposely shoots that pede-
strian in the head.  Nevertheless, no state punishes the more indiscri-
minate crime more severely than the less indiscriminate crime.  For 
the reasons discussed earlier, the introduction of passion and provo-
cation provides no reason for altering this culpability calculus.117 
The important issue for the court in Wingate should not have been 
whether a heat-of-passion killer kills indiscriminately but rather 
whether a heat-of-passion killer kills unintentionally.  Other courts 
and commentators, consistently with the example of Lenny and Maury 
and the arguments advanced by this Comment, have noted that a 
heat-of-passion killer may act with extreme recklessness, as opposed to 
intent to kill, and have concluded that the passion/provocation de-
fense should be equally applicable to both culpability levels.118 
 
115 See supra Part I. 
116 See supra notes 6-11. 
117 See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text. 
118 See United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (“While most 
[passion/provocation] cases involve intent to kill, it is possible that a defendant who 
killed unintentionally but recklessly with extreme disregard for human life may have 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has examined the availability of 
the passion/provocation defense to a charge of extreme-recklessness 
homicide as a statutory, rather than a constitutional, issue with equally 
unpersuasive results.  The court reasoned in State v. Grunow that 
“[t]he Legislature could have concluded, on the basis of common ex-
perience, that passion/provocation usually causes an intentional reac-
tion and that it is rare for passion/provocation to lead to reckless-
ness.”119  The court further postulated that the legislature did not 
make the passion/provocation defense available to a charge of ex-
treme-recklessness homicide, perhaps due to a legislative compro-
mise.120  Because a killing that resulted from extremely reckless con-
duct was treated as murder at common law, the legislature “would rest 
content,” the court imagined, with simply downgrading the offense to 
aggravated manslaughter.121  In other words, the court’s response to 
the argument that an offender such as Lenny Lessculpable is being 
subjected to disparate treatment forbidden by the Equal Protection 
Clause is simply, “It could have been worse.”  Although Lenny, having 
caused the death of another person through extremely reckless con-
duct in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation, faces 
ten to thirty years in prison rather than five to ten years, if the pas-
sion/provocation defense were available, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rests content that the guarantee of equal protection is met since 
the severity of the unfairness could be greater.  Lenny should be satis-
fied serving ten to thirty years, the argument goes, since the Legisla-
ture could well have imposed a sentence of thirty years to life.  While 
this reasoning may explain why the legislature chose not to provide 
the defense to a charge of aggravated manslaughter, it fails to account 
for the rationality of the resulting disparate punishment. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s faulty comparative statutory 
analysis in Grunow illustrates the difficulties courts have faced in re-
cognizing punishment/culpability problems as violations of equal pro-
tection.  Dissection of the court’s analysis reveals its focused attention 
on the Code’s language and structure and its neglect of the constitu-
tional problem at hand.  To illustrate that New Jersey’s Code of Crim-
 
acted in the heat of passion with adequate provocation.”); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra 
note 91, § 7.10(a) (“Most killings which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the 
intent-to-kill sort . . . . But if [a defendant] should intend instead to do his tormentor 
serious bodily injury short of death . . . the resulting death ought equally be voluntary 
manslaughter rather than murder or no crime.”).   
119 506 A.2d 708, 714 (N.J. 1986).  
120 Id. at 712-13.  
121 Id. at 713. 
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inal Justice is “not without precedent,” the New Jersey Supreme Court 
pointed to similar provisions of three other states’ criminal codes 
(New York, Connecticut, and Oregon) that also prohibit the mitiga-
tion of extreme-recklessness homicide via the passion/provocation de-
fense.122  Discussing Oregon’s passion/provocation statute, the court 
noted that, like New Jersey’s, it does not provide for the mitigation of 
first-degree manslaughter, a criminal homicide “committed recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life,”123 to second-degree manslaughter upon proof of the re-
quirements of the passion/provocation defense.124  This is an accurate 
reading of both the Oregon and New Jersey statutes’ language and 
structure. 
The court, however, overlooked another subsection of the Oregon 
statute that highlights a crucial distinction between the states’ laws—a 
distinction rendering Oregon’s Code in harmony with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and New Jersey’s Code resoundingly in discord.  While 
the Oregon Code does not allow the passion/provocation defense to 
mitigate what would be extreme-recklessness homicide under the New 
Jersey Code to a second-degree offense, the Oregon Code does not 
allow the passion/provocation defense to mitigate a purposeful or 
knowing killing to a second-degree offense.125  Under the Oregon 
Code, the passion/provocation defense only mitigates criminal homi-
cide committed purposely or knowingly from murder to first-degree 
manslaughter and not from murder to second-degree manslaughter, 
as the New Jersey Code does.126  The Oregon statute therefore does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the mitigating effect 
of the passion/provocation defense is not needed for those offenders 
who act with extreme recklessness in response to passion and provoca-
tion.  An offender who, in the heat of passion and upon reasonable 
provocation, recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting 
an extreme indifference to human life is subject to the same punish-
 
122 Id. 
123 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(a) (2007). 
124 Grunow, 506 A.2d at 713. 
125 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118(1)(b) (2007). 
126 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4 (West 2005) (“Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter when: . . . A homicide which would otherwise be murder . . . is commit-
ted in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. . . . Manslaughter is 
a crime of the second degree.”), with OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.118(1)(b), 163.135(1) 
(2007) (“[E]xtreme emotional disturbance . . . [is] a mitigating circumstance reducing 
the homicide that would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in the first de-
gree . . . .”). 
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ment as an offender responding to an identical passion and provoca-
tion who purposely or knowingly causes death.127  Oregon’s statutory 
scheme is identical to Connecticut’s statutory scheme.128  Therefore, 
two of the three state codes cited by the court in Grunow do not share 
the constitutional infirmities of New Jersey’s Code.  While the New 
Jersey Supreme Court is the only state’s highest court to have been 
presented with the passion/provocation punishment/culpability 
problem, the court in Grunow not only failed to offer an explanation 
for the Code’s disparate treatment, but also failed to grasp the extent 
of the disparate treatment and New Jersey’s outlier status as compared 
to its sister states. 
CONCLUSION 
A criminal code that fails to calibrate punishment to culpability not 
only deviates from established principles of criminal law but also raises 
constitutional concerns.  A code that punishes less culpable offenders 
more severely than more culpable offenders guilty of the same crime vi-
olates the Equal Protection Clause.  Like any governmental classifica-
tion that does not implicate a suspect class or impinge upon a funda-
mental right, legislation that creates a punishment/culpability problem 
must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  The few courts 
that have considered the issue have failed to articulate a principled basis 
for deviating from the usual deference afforded by rational basis review.  
The “one step at a time” rationale often employed in rational basis re-
view has proven incompatible with criminal law’s attempt to create a 
carefully calibrated system of punishment and culpability.  The institu-
tional and political challenges that accompany the correction of dispari-
ties between punishment and culpability justify heightened judicial re-
view and reduced deference to the legislative process. 
Six states deny the passion/provocation defense to charges of ex-
treme-recklessness homicide, while offering the defense to those who 
commit purposeful or knowing homicide.  The high courts in at least 
six states have an opportunity to develop coherent equal protection 
jurisprudence to be applied to the punishment/culpability problem.  
To be sure, victims of the punishment/culpability problem resemble 
the traditional beneficiaries of Equal Protection Clause scrutiny in 
 
127 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2007). 
128 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54a to 53a-55 (2008) (establishing purposeful ho-
micide under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance as manslaughter in the 
first degree). 
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very few ways.  Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment entrusts 
courts with the responsibility to develop coherent doctrine to protect 
all classes of persons, sympathetic or not, against injustice and un-
equal treatment. 
 
